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ROUHANI’S KEY: SYMBOLS AND RITUALS  





This short paper is written within the framework of the 
anthropology of politics and of emotions. It focuses on the 
importance of symbols in the manipulation of the political behaviour 
of the people: « Emotions matter more than ever in a world where 
media are playing the role of a sounding board and a magnifying 
glass » (Moisi, 2009: 4). We should note that the religious network 
in Iran is a widespread organ which is responsible for most of the 
rituals which occur in people’s life cycles, and this puts these rituals 
in contact with the people. The religious networks are constantly 
engaged in the management of rituals; and the manipulation of the 
people’s feelings of joy, pain and sublimation are some of their 
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1  Data gathering for this research took place in May and June 2013. 
Newspapers from various tendencies were studied, television programs 
followed, and on the most important day before elections a trip was made 
within the city to gather visual information and to go to various candidates 
locales, and to be at Palestine Square where one of the candidates was 
going to give a speech and then to walk up the most important city street, 
Vali Asr, to see the supporters of various candidates. This year, university 
semester ended sooner than usual, and given the load of work I had to finish 
before the elections, I had limited time for all this work. 
 





arte-facts: « It is one task of governments to study the emotions of 
their respective peoples, to capitalize on them if they are positive, to 
try to reverse or contain them if they are negative » (Moisi, 2009: 
20). The presence of clergy not only at weddings and mortuaries but 
at yearly processions of Ashura and religious gatherings (rowze) puts 
them in contact with the people’s pains, needs, views and aspirations 
and they have managed to have a discourse to relate to situations as 
diverse as there are ethnic groups, classes, ages and sexes. 
According to Kertzer: « Rituals bring all the people together, 
sanctifying their unity and thus counteracting the divisiveness 
tendencies that plague daily social life. The greater the divisiveness 
in society, the greater the need for compensatory rituals to hold the 
society together » (1988: 63). The power of the clergy to control 
rituals is thus uncontested, and voting is managed as a regular ritual 
in political life of Iran today. 
According to Rappaport, « beliefs are privately held and in 
some sense unknowable, while rituals provide public statements of 
acceptance of a group’s position… [ritual] is visible, explicit, public 
act of acceptance, and not the invisible, ambiguous, private 
sentiment that is social and morally binding. Socially and politically 
speaking we are what we do, not what we think » (Kertzer, op. cit.: 
69). 
Moisi in his book Geopolitics of Emotions, considers hope, 
fear and humiliation. I have found these concepts helpful to 
understand the people’s responses to participation in democratic 
behavior which is the essence of voting. 
In June 2012 I had a visitor from Paris who asked me and all 
friends we met if they were going to vote in 2013, and what could 
bring people to participate in the elections. The responses were all 
morose and no one would even put the time and energy to seriously 
respond to this question. After 2009 events, which still was keeping 
two candidates of the election under house arrest, who would 
possibly go to vote? A spirit of delusion was in the air. 
Articles in daily news-papers leading to the date of election all 
had negative titles: they were related to unemployment, inflation and 





rising prices for food and lodging, lowering value of Iranian 
currency, corruption, increasing sanctions against Iran, decrease in 
the export of oil, increases in the level of divorce and addiction, etc. 
It was within this helpless and totally locked atmosphere of 
hopelessness that the leader pronounced at the moment of the New 
Year a motto for the year. He, said this would be the year of Epical 
Politics, Epical Economy (hamâseye siyâasi, hamâseye eqtesâdi). 
Murmurs of criticism were heard: how can something be called 
epical before it happens? During these short months – from March 
21
st
 to June 14
th
 – leading to the elections, the president of the time 
was doing whatever was in his power to do, to make his candidate 
Mashâyee (father-in-law of his son), previous head of Cultural 
Heritage, Handicrafts and Tourism Organization (ICHTO), a viable 
candidate to show that he did not want to lose power after this 
election, and that he would stay on and hoped to be re-elected after 
four years. Everyone recalled President Putin and Medvedev. His 
slogan was « spring » (bahâr) which he repeated three times during 
his New Year allocutions. 
During the last electoral campaign what had given sparkles to 
the elections were disclosures to the public about candidates which 
occurred during debates. In May 2013, in a discourse in the 
parliament, the President showed a short film on one of the brothers 
Larijani (there are five in office), holding key positions, and this film 
eventually discredited one of the brothers, who is head of the 
parliament and who then couldn’t become a candidate. Time was 
passing fast. No competition of any personalities was in the air. To 
allow disclosures to give vivacity to the elections would have been 
too costly for the state, yet I was expecting an election motto to 
become « Disclose, disclose … ». This became a columnist’s view 
also (see Sorush Farhadian « Pole Efšâ » [bridge of disclosure] in 
newspaper Bahâr, 25/4/2003). 
The situation was still very dull, and so tense that on the side 
of the reformists, the last minute candidacy of one of the founders of 
the Revolution, Hâshemi Rafsanjâni gave some sparkles to the 
headlines and the people. This old man became the hope of a young 





nation, as he had become eight years ago when the present president 
winned for the first time. The Revolution had not produced any new 
candidates. Even his candidacy came after he was urged by 
Ayatollah Sistâni in Najaf had poignantly and authoritatively advised 
him to do so, in prevention of worse disasters for the country. The 
idea of the fall of the nation, or its division in various areas is the 
most fearful thing which could happen. Moisi says: « In its most 
common interpretation, fear is an emotional response to the 
perception, real or imagined, of an impending danger. Fear leads to a 
defensive reflex that reveals and reflects the identity and the fragility 
of a person, a culture, or a civilization at a given moment… Fear 
stimulates attentiveness to one’s surroundings and is in that sense a 
constructive emotion, a natural protective instinct » (2009: 92). 
From the 6
th
 till the 12
th
 of May, registration for presidential 
candidates would take place, and the eligible candidates would be 
pronounced on the 22
nd
 of May. From 648 candidates including 30 
women, eight men were screened, approved and found eligible by 
the Assembly of Experts, pronounced by the ministry of Interior. The 
names of Mashâyee and Hâshemi Rafsanjâni were not among them. 
The latter’s age was mentioned as an impediment for his final 
approval. Nothing was mentioned for refusing Mashayee and all the 
other candidates. Again a feeling of hopelessness took over. The 
eight eligible candidates had 23 days to campaign all over the 
country, to participate in debates in the television. There were seven 
well-known civil servants and one religious man in robe and turban. 
How could in such a short time candidates have their propaganda 
films made, travel, discuss, present, interact and find their future 
government ministers, programs etc.? How could they produce the 
most viable mottos and symbols to carry their messages deep into all 
the different corners of the country. A reductive and artistic cognitive 
power was necessary to crystallize the situation and produce a 
symbolic solution. Given that there were eight candidates, it could 
easily get to a second round. At the beginning it was said there was 
one candidate from the reformist side, and the rest were from the 
conservative tendency. The reformist, first vice-president during 





Khatami’s Presidency (2001-05), Aref, appeared with his wife in his 
first campaign. None of the other candidates made such symbolic 
appearances. People’s murmur was that the president was already 
chosen, and there would be a vote which would correspond to this 
decision. So, the feeling was still one of resignation and not 
discussion nor participation. Guesses went toward Velâyati, a 
medical doctor who had served as Minister of Foreign Affairs 
(1981-97), and Jalili (parallel cousin of Ali Khamenei, MSS), 
Secretary of Supreme National Security Council (2007-13), who had 
been present on the international scene on the nuclear agenda. 
Others, Hadâd Adel (Chair of the Parliament 2004-08, also 
father-in-law of Ali Khamenei’s son) and Qarazi, Minister of the 
Post, were the weaker figures, but Qâlibâf (WSS of Ali Khamenei), 
the mayor of Tehran since 2005, had been very active for years 
trying to prove himself as a devoted military and efficient bureaucrat 
at the service of the people. This could be seen within the city on 
daily basis. What about Ruhâni? Who was he, and how did he win 
with this overwhelming majority? Here is where the power of 
appearance and symbols count, the power of demagogy and 
intelligence of a person who can juggle ideas and symbols at crucial 
time with great dexterity. What is general knowledge about Ruhani 
today was not public knowledge at the time of elections. He was a 
self-contained person, more in the backstage than on the headlines 
like Mashayee, and not related to any important public personalities.  
He was of modest background, born in a small town called 
Sorxe, near Semnân, east of Tehran, in 1948. His name was Hasan 
Fereydun, and his father died with this last name in 2011, Asadollah 
Fereydun. As early as 1981 he had found his name unfit and made in 
Hasan Fereydun Ruhani (cleric or holy). At the time of his 
presidential candidacy his name had become Hasan Ruhani. He went 
to the Semnan Seminary and then to Qom to complete his religious 
studies, but also went to Tehran University and in 1969 got his BA in 
Judicial Law. He went to the military service in 1973, and he was 
from early on a follower of Ayatollah Khomeini. As early as in 1977 
at the memorial of Mostafâ Khomeini at Tehran Ark Mosque he used 





the term Imam for Ayatollah Khomeini. In 1978, he went to Paris 
and his picture is seen at Neauphle-le-Château sitting behind 
Khomeini. After the Revolution, in 1979, he became responsible for 
the organization of the disorderly Iranian army and military bases. 
He also became deputy from Semnan to the Assembly of Experts. In 
1980 he was elected deputy to the parliament and served five terms, 
which makes 20 years. During eight years he was the head of the 
Defense Committee, and during another eight years he was the head 
of the Policy Committee. In 1980-1983 he was the leader of the 
Supervisory Council of IRI Broadcasting, and during the Iran-Iraq 
War, in 1982-1988, he was a member of the Supreme Defense 
Council. In 1986 he became Commander of Iran Air Defense Force, 
and got first grade Nasr Medal from Commander-in-Chief of Armed 
Forces Ali Khamenei. After the War, he was representative of the 
latter at the Supreme National Security Council (SNSC). He kept this 
highly sensitive post under the presidency of Hashemi Rafsanjani, 
and Khatami, in 1989-1997 and 2000-2005. 
Meanwhile, he still was interested in law and managed to go to 
Scotland and got a M. Phil degree in law (1995) from Glaslow 
Caledonian University, to be followed by a Ph. D. in Constitutional 
Law (1999), the topics of which are also significant: « The Islamic 
legislative power with reference to the Iranian experience » and 
« The flexibility of Shari’a with reference to the Iranian 
experience ». From 1991 at the Center for Strategic Center, he 
became the Managing Editor of three journals, Rahbord (Strategy), 
Foreign Relations and Iranian Review of Foreign Affairs. 
At the Expediency Council, he was the head of the Political, 
Defense and Security Committees. In March 2013, at the same 
assembly he became responsible for the Commission for 
Investigating Ways of Protecting and Guarding the position of 
Supreme Leader (velayate faqih). So this man had occupied key 
posts in diplomacy, law, religion, military and the academia (from 
the Internet, 02/2014). 
From the beginning of the Iranian New Year (March 21
st
) it 
was continuously repeated that security was under high alert and we 





could see various security corps in the city at different places and 
times. Elections had to proceed without tension and bloodshed, and 
the school year was to finish earlier than in the other years in order 
to prevent the congregation of lots of young people at high schools 
or universities. What was already repeated was that the election had 
to become a joyful event, porneshât (joyful) was a repeated word. 
Television clips were constant, showing presence at poll booths, 
people showing their identity cards, their stamped fingers, and 
smiling with the « V » sign. Activities of the candidates were under 
great surveillance, as pasting of propaganda on streets were 
concerned, or their use of the public media, or their disclosures 
related to other candidates. They had individual sites, but their 
presence in the radio and television showed total equality in time 
allocation. Their televised presence on programs was regulated 
within definite boundaries, to which some candidates reacted. At 
times it was like if they were school children who were repeating 
their lessons, no more.  
There were three debates and even these were in the form of 
one person presenting his program, and others asking him questions, 
and he responding afterwards. The debate which made a difference 
and made the differences be noticed took place on June 8
th
. The 
topic was internal and international politics, and here one disclosure 
gave sparkles and became a decisive moment. It was on this debate 
that Ruhâni speaking to Qâlibâf said: « I am a man of law, not a 
military man ». He spoke of freedom of speech and equality among 
all ethnic groups, and he put into question the mayor of Tehran who 
had been planting millions of flowers and trees in the city, raising 
numerous flags of patriotism, and constructing kilometers of 
highways, including tunnels and bridges. He did this by speaking of 
a scar which had not yet been healed, from more than 14 years ago, 
when the police had attacked students (18
th
 of Tir [9
th
 of July, 
1999]). Qâlibâf who had been the head of the police had favored 
giving permits to students to hold a meeting so that he would capture 
them, while Ruhâni in his official capacity had been against such a 
method. These were catchy words and ideas, something people 





could relate to and needed badly, law and good behaviour towards 
the youth. He had the audacity to provoke such a touchy topic but 
then remained within the boundaries set by the program, yet he had 
spoken of liberty and justice, words which were reminiscent of 
Khâtami period. While he could not at this time show direct alliance 
with Khâtami. It was another candidate, Aref who later resigned 
giving his support to Ruhani. With his neat clothing and appearance 
he was a definite reminder of what the people could utmost hope for: 
another Khâtami. We should note that it was only three days before 
the final vote that Aref, the reformist candidate gave his dispense, 
and Khâtami and Hâshemi Rafsanjâni gave their support to Ruhâni. 
Meanwhile, television programs allocated equal time to all 
candidates, and each candidate had a propaganda clip. In his film, 
Ruhani had taken off his turban and was sitting in a small cheap 
Iranian car, a Pride, and was discussing his views. All candidates 
were shown arriving in a location, people going to welcome them, 
then their hands up in the air when they pronounced something 
important, a few close-ups, and then some distant shots where the 
candidate was submerged by his followers. These images were not 
decisive, though Qalibaf’s film attempted through the use of 
emotions to appeal to the people. He recalled the experience of his 
martyr brother and dropped some tears, a very effective way of 
attracting sympathy. But the people’s problems and hopes for a 




 of May, on Channel 2 TV, in his first group debate, 
at one point he pulled out a huge cardboard key, saying what was 
impossible, but that he had the key to all the problems people had. 
At the beginning we evoked the problems which were reflected in 
the headlines of the newspapers, and that it was being said, again 
and again, how difficult it was to « unlock » the complex situation 
which had been produced during the past eight years, and how many 
years were necessary to return to the economic situation of even four 
years before etc. etc. So it was totally audacious to think of having a 
key to the problems, and the impossible dream was what Ruhâni 





tried to appeal to, in order to give hope and try to save the nation 
from threat of total disarray and collapse, a total humiliation for the 
nation.  
A repeated phrase among the people ever since the Revolution 
when inflation, war, unemployment, or any other problem were 
evoked, was, « these are still our good days ». So in the Iranian 
psyche something worse could happen, it could still go down, and 
the people had the capacity to bear these difficulties. But ever since 
the effect of sanctions and mismanagement of the country evoked 
above, it was as if though the bottom line was reached, and the 
reaction to all these pains was a definite change, and that is why this 
catchy phrase (« these are still our good days ») was no longer 
repeated. It was a  they had reached the end of fear and humiliation, 
and this exclamation of expectation of a doomsday, was no longer 
repeated during the last few months before the election period. They 
were craving for hope, they wanted to become hopeful, and someone 
provided them with the key, the miracle they were hoping to get. We 
should not forget that the young population of the country who is 
educated and entrepreneurial had been hearing from the President 
during the last eight years the expression « We can », so this was a 
leitmotif in the key symbols which the youth jumped unto to believe 
that they would be able to rebuild the structures in such a way to 
produce jobs, control prices, and to live peacefully with the outside 
world. The key became a strong symbol for Ruhani, and after the 
election it continued to be mentioned (newspapers Qanun, June 18th 
2013; Arman, July 16th 2013 and recently Etemad, January 13th 
2014, and all on the cover page). 
Another reminiscent of previous elections was the issue of the 
green color which was a very potent symbol not only within the 
country, but communicated internationally. It was a part of Iranian 
flag, symbolized Islam, and it represented environmental 
consciousness too. The candidates tried to have some colors, and 
this became evident during the last days of publicity. Once Qarazi 
put a wide green band around his neck, Jalili had the Palestinian 
black and white « chafia » (exactly as the Leader) often around his 





neck, Rezâ’yee used blue, Qalibâf used yellow in the form of a 
ribbon or yellow flowers that his followers carried to his last speech, 
Hadâd Adel and Velâyati faded in shades of gray and at times red, 
but again here Ruhâni had a pronounced use of the purple color (this 
also showed sensitivity to the fashionable color of the year also). On 
the streets some of his young followers had a green band on one 
wrist and a purple one on another, and my final observation was in 
the metro late at night when a girl was tying her last piece of purple 
ribbon with a metallic key on another girl’s wrist. Purple for the 
youth was a continuation of green, a color that had become too 
stigmatized to be used. Sedition (fetne) is the term used for the 
followers of the Green Movement by the conservatives. 
What happened after the announcement of the results which 
was spectacular, because had he not won on the first ballot, it would 
have become much more difficult for him to win on the second 
ballot. He succeeded the first time and this avoided what had 
happened eight years ago when the present President first came into 
office against Hâshemi Rafsanjâni. A street feast followed. Upon 
hearing the announcement of the Minister of Interior, people flooded 
the streets, on foot and on car, and as traffic jams are usually stifling, 
on this evening and night they totally paralyzed the city till the early 
hours of the morning. On this night there were no policemen to 
prevent the flow of the population. They could not go through them, 
so they let them be. The public place became private. What is 
definitely not allowed on the streets, happened, and that was dancing 
in the streets. The defiant bodies used the cars as shields and as 
music came loud and happy from these parked cars in the middle of 
the streets, crowds danced, boys and girls, men and women, with all 
the bodily movements (see Shahshahani, 2004) which are prohibited 
in the public spaces. After this joyful Saturday, the victory of the 
Iranian football team on Tuesday brought again a proud crowd to the 
streets: Another joyful night for the citizens of particularly Tehran, 
are now proud of having gained international recognition. « When 
your team wins on the global state, you feel "on the top of the 





world", united in a collective manner with the national team whose 
triumph you share » (Moisi op. cit.: 19). 
The end result became a happy Leader who was finally able to 
control the emotions and reasons of the people in a way to go and 
vote and to have a man in religious attire in office, a man whose 
name had been Fereydun before, an Iranian epical name, but who 
had changed it to Ruhâni (meaning spiritual, clergy) many years ago. 
By using the motto « Prudence and Hope » for his future 
government, he had been able to capture the attention and the trust 
of the people. So, the people of Iran on June 14
th
 did what had been 
done many times before them: in electing a president, they elected 
the chief symbol-maker of their land. 
In this analysis, while Moisi’s concepts have served us, yet his 
view on Iran needs revision: « Iran is a young country whose 
striving, open energy has nothing to do with the profound 
anachronistic nature of the "bearded clerics" who lead it » (op. cit.: 
127). The « bearded clerics » have once more persuaded the people 
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Merging the three fields of anthropology of emotions, politics of emotions 
and anthropology of symbolism, we try to understand the coming to power 
of a figure in Iranian politics, who is no one but the actual president elected 
in 2013. With one symbol developed and used during the last days of his 
campaign, Rouhani did the impossible task of convincing the people, who 
had lost interest and trust in participating in elections, to go to the booths 
again and vote for him, a religious dignitary. Attention is paid to ritual as a 
specialized domain of religious experts. My claim is that focusing for a few 
days on one potent symbol, was a very efficient tactic to win this election. 
 
Key-words: Iran, elections, symbolism, emotions. 
 
Résumé 
La clef de Rouhani : les symboles et les rituels des élections 
présidentielles iraniennes de 2013 
Fusionnant l’anthropologie et la politique des émotions avec 
l’anthropologie symbolique, nous entreprenons de comprendre l’arrivée au 
pouvoir d'une nouvelle figure dans la politique iranienne qui n’est autre que 
le président élu en 2013. Grâce à un symbole développé et utilisé pendant 
les ultimes jours de sa campagne, Rouhani est parvenu à convaincre les 
gens qui avaient perdu tout intérêt et confiance dans la participation aux 
élections de se rendre aux isoloirs à nouveau et voter pour lui, un dignitaire 
religieux. Une attention particulière est accordée dans cet article au rituel 
comme un domaine spécialisé des experts religieux, mon hypothèse étant 
que l’utilisation intense pendant un très court temps d’un symbole puissant 
a été une stratégie très efficace pour remporter cette élection. 
 
Mots-clefs : Iran, stratégie électorale, symbolisme, émotions. 
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